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We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT)
for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage
in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments
allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely
in those states that signal monitoring. We ﬁnd that optimal CRT
enhances loan monitoring and expands ﬁnancial intermediation,
in contrast to the ﬁndings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT
instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual
loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as
banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs
to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring
incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth
is transferred from the bank’s ﬁnanciers to the bank. Properly
designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent
such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive
to engage in optimal CRT.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, the banking paradigm adhered quite well to real-world practice: loans were held
on the balance sheet until maturity or default, and the bank’s main risk-management tool was
portfolio diversiﬁcation. Retaining the loans and diversifying away their idiosyncratic risks allowed
debt-ﬁnanced banks to retain monitoring incentives and hence perform the role of delegated moni-
tors (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984).
While banks have continued to raise funds mainly via debt (including deposits), they now engage
extensively in loan sales and more generally in credit risk transfer (CRT), as documented by BBA
(2004), ECB (2004), BIS (2005a), Minton et al. (2005), Duﬃe (2007). The transfer of risk on unrated
borrowers, who typically need bank monitoring, is increasing steadily (FitchRatings, 2004). This has
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attracted the attention of policy makers and national and supranational supervisors, prompting an
enormous number of reports (e.g. BBA, 2004; BIS, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; IMF, 2002). The ambivalence
of these reports about the merits of CRT is well captured by Buffett (2002), who argues that CRT may
harm the stability of the ﬁnancial sector. By contrast, Greenspan (2005) highlights the evidence that
in the early 2000s U.S. recession corporate failures neither caused banking failures nor harmed the
ﬁnancial sector as a whole, owing to the widespread use of loan securitization and credit derivatives.
That is, Greenspan notes the merits of CRT as a risk-management tool, whereas Buffett points out
the potential defect of allowing banks to forfeit their monitoring/screening role. Current credit market
turmoil, also triggered by the asset quality problems of the so-called sub-prime market, seems to
support Buffett’s view and raise doubts about the provision of incentives underlying the new pattern
of intermediation, the so-called originate-to-distribute (OTD) model. But, is the OTD model necessarily
harmful, or are the CRT instruments used that distort incentives. If so, why are they used? What is
the role for prudential regulation?
The literature generally ﬁnds that CRT weakens banks’ monitoring incentives, and hence under-
mines ﬁnancial stability.1 This paper revisits the issue, imposing no exogenous restrictions on the
nature of CRT instruments. In keeping with the evidence that correlation of defaults is driven by the
business cycle (BIS, 2005b; Keenan, 2000), we allow for aggregate risk: loans are subject to idiosyn-
cratic risks and to a common, macroeconomic, risk factor. As in many other models, monitoring by
banks improves the expected return from loans. However, in our model the effect of such monitoring
is most valuable in economic downturns; monitoring lowers loan default probability, but still results
in some defaults. Properly devised CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against losses
precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We ﬁnd that optimal CRT enhances loan monitor-
ing and expands ﬁnancial intermediation, in contrast to the ﬁndings of the previous literature.2 We
also show that optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans,
and have credit-enhancement guarantees. In our model, optimal CRT maximizes the lending level for
which the bank ﬁnds it incentive-compatible to monitor (its incentive-based lending capacity) for any
given amount of capital. Or, equivalently, optimal CRT allows banks to economize on capital: any given
amount of incentive-compatible lending can be sustained with minimum capital.3
Portfolio CRT instruments (e.g. loan portfolio securitization) with credit-enhancement guarantees
are pretty much the instruments used by banks.4 But we ﬁnd that the extent of credit enhancement
needs to be precisely delimited; it must be within a deﬁned interval. Outside that interval, mon-
itoring incentives are undermined. The bank will never provide too little credit enhancement; the
dilution of monitoring incentives (the deterioration of loan quality) would be factored into the pricing
of the insuﬃciently-credit-enhanced securities. However, the bank has an incentive to provide exces-
sive credit enhancement. This undermines monitoring incentives and transfers wealth from depositors
to the bank in a way that makes the bank better off. We show that properly designed risk-based cap-
ital requirements prevent such a wealth transfer and provide banks with the incentive to engage in
optimal CRT.
The intuition for our results is as follows. By monitoring or screening loan applicants, the bank
raises the quality of its borrowers’ projects, which improves loan portfolio performance in bad times.
But the bank is subject to moral hazard even when it is perfectly diversiﬁed and all idiosyncratic risk
is diversiﬁed away. It may be tempted to bet that fortunate external circumstances (a macroeconomic
1 The theoretical literature on ﬁnancial intermediation stresses banks’ monitoring role (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond,
1984; Fama, 1985; Hellwig, 1991; Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; see also the banking literature
review by Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). There is also ample evidence that bank monitoring improves the quality of the ﬁrms
ﬁnanced (Datta et al., 1999; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989). There is also a broader literature on ﬁnancial system
architecture where banks and markets both emerge endogenously, and banks play a monitoring role (Boot and Thakor, 1997;
Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002).
2 See Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duffee and Zhou (2001), Morrison (2005), Behr and Lee (2005), Parlour
and Winton (2007) and Parlour and Plantin (2008).
3 This ﬁts the empirical evidence that banks that engage in CRT have greater leverage and make more business loans
(Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004).
4 The BBA credit derivatives reports (2001/02, 2003/04) highlight the rapid increase in portfolio products and among them in
loan portfolio securitization, which is estimated to account for about 26% of products by the end of 2004.
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upturn) will sustain the borrowers’ performance, avoid costly monitoring and shift the (unmonitored)
loan losses that emerge in downturns to its ﬁnanciers. The bank’s moral hazard problem is addressed
by two instruments: reward for monitoring (the carrot), and capital per unit of lending (the stick), so
that the more likely losses due to poor monitoring are borne partially by the bank’s owners (insiders).
Since bank capital is a scarce resource,5 an optimal contract for the bank to raise funds minimizes
the capital injection (stick) and stresses the reward (carrot). It uses the information conveyed by the
bank’s loan portfolio return and rewards the bank as much as possible for those outcomes that signal
monitoring, in the sense of Holmstrom (1979). Our point, however, is that these monitoring–revealing
outcomes are not the “high” outcomes in terms of the returns on the bank’s loan portfolio. In our
model, high outcomes may result from good luck (an economic upturn) rather than monitoring. As
a result, debt ﬁnancing for banks is suboptimal. With debt, the better the outcome, the greater the
debtor’s income: the bank is rewarded for good luck rather than for monitoring.
Optimal CRT addresses the shortcomings of deposit/debt ﬁnancing. It reallocates the bank’s income
from lucky states, when its portfolio returns are high, to those that are more informative about its
monitoring effort. This decreases the amount of capital per unit of lending the bank must inject to
ﬁnd it incentive-compatible to monitor, and incentive-based lending capacity expands. It raises more
outside funds and its lending expands, but it still monitors. This explains why CRT increases eﬃciency.
Optimal CRT is based on loan portfolio and is backed by a precise extent of credit-enhancement
guarantees. The bank is insured against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring;
its incentive-based lending capacity is maximized.
One result we get, then, is that contrary to what is often claimed CRT enhances banks’ monitoring
role, if used properly. Much of the previous literature argues that CRT necessarily weakens monitor-
ing incentives (Pennacchi, 1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005;
Behr and Lee, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Parlour and Winton, 2007). In all these works debt
ﬁnancing maximizes the reward for monitoring (see Section 4). Additional arrangements, such as
CRT, can only reduce monitoring incentives. In contrast, in our paper, optimal CRT creates value on
incentive-based grounds: it lowers the amount of capital a bank must have at stake in order for
a monitoring incentive to subsist. It thus expands incentive-based lending capacity, and hence the
availability of monitored ﬁnance. Furthermore, as a risk-management tool, CRT complements diversi-
ﬁcation: the prior construction of diversiﬁed loan portfolios enables optimal CRT to insulate the bank
from exogenous risk (given monitoring). Monitoring incentives are enhanced.
However, for these value/welfare gains to obtain, banks must have the incentive to engage in
optimal CRT. The bank, having promised to engage in optimal CRT, may not honor this promise once
having raised funds—the time-inconsistency/commitment problem which arises in hedging (Smith and
Stulz, 1985; see Section 7). And indeed, after having borrowed funds and made loans, an unregulated
bank would have an incentive to retain loan risks. We examine the role of market forces and of
prudential regulation in solving this problem (Section 6).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the
optimal bank ﬁnancing contract. Section 4 analyses banks’ monitoring incentive problem under debt
ﬁnancing. Section 5 shows that debt ﬁnancing with CRT implements the optimal contract, provided
banks can commit to engage in optimal CRT after borrowing. Section 6 analyses banks’ ex-post incen-
tives to engage in optimal CRT, and the role for prudential regulation. In Section 7 we discuss related
literature on CRT in greater detail. Section 8 concludes.
2. The model
A bank has the opportunity to ﬁnance a portfolio (continuum) of loans whose size L is derived
endogenously. It funds lending out of internal funds (capital) and outside ﬁnance from ﬁnal investors.
5 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for a discussion of costs of bank capital. For reasons of adverse selection about the quality
of bank loan portfolios, not modeled here, many scholars, e.g., Bolton and Freixas (2000), hold that bank capital is more costly
than other sources of bank funding.
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Table 1
Project return distribution
Bank’s action θ θ
Monitoring Pr(X = R) = 1 Pr(X = R) = α
Not monitoring Pr(X = R) = 1 Pr(X = R) = α
The supply of outside ﬁnance is perfectly elastic at a gross rate of return that is normalized to one
(i.e. the risk-free net interest rate is zero). That is, ﬁnal investors are assumed to make zero proﬁts.
The bank acts on behalf of its shareholders (insiders), whose equity holdings constitute the bank’s
endowment of inside capital, K .
2.1. Project technology and monitoring
Lending consists in project ﬁnancing. A project requires one unit of resources at date 0 and
gives the bank a return X ∈ {0, R} at date 1. The probability of success, Pr(X = R), depends on
the project type t ∈ {g,b} and on the realization at date 1 of a common, macroeconomic, risk fac-
tor θ ∈ {θ, θ}. Here θ denotes the good realization, an economic upturn, and occurs with probability
p > 0; θ denotes the bad realization, the downturn, and occurs with probability, 1− p. If at date 1
the common-factor realization is θ (upturn), then a project succeeds for sure regardless of its type. If
the common-factor realization is θ (downturn), then a type g project succeeds with probability α < 1
and a type b project succeeds with probability α < α. A project is of type g if and only if it has been
monitored by the bank at the beginning of the period. Table 1 shows the distribution of project return
conditional on the bank’s action and the realization of the common risk factor.
Monitoring may consist either of services tailored to the borrower, or a set of constraints on
his choice among projects by appropriate debt covenants, whose fulﬁllment is then monitored. For
example, an unconstrained borrower might select the speciﬁc project for possible private beneﬁts.
Monitoring may also consist of screening borrowers, i.e. costly testing of the borrower’s creditworthi-
ness in an adverse-selection environment.6
Monitoring has a cost to the bank of F > 0 per project. This is a non-pecuniary effort cost. F may
also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of eschewing insider lending, forgoing the private beneﬁts
of collusion with the borrower on a bad (type b) project.7
We further specify the model by making the following assumptions:
Assumption A1. An unmonitored project has negative net present value:
pR + (1− p)αR < 1. (A1)
Assumption A2. A monitored project has positive net present value:
pR + (1− p)αR > 1+ F . (A2)
Assumption A3. The bank’s monitoring/screening choices are unobservable.
We assume that the bank either monitors the entire portfolio or does not monitor at all. That is,
we rule out monitoring of only some loans. This simpliﬁes the exposition with no loss of generality.
Indeed, since the monitoring technology has constant return to scale, partial monitoring is never
optimal (Chiesa, 2001).
6 In this case, the bank’s monitoring cost is the cost of the test, divided by the probability that the borrower has a good
(type g) project (see Chiesa, 1998).
7 See Repullo and Suarez (1998) for an explicit analysis of collusion between the entrepreneur and the monitoring/informed
lender.
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2.2. Portfolio outcomes
For simplicity, loan portfolios are assumed to be perfectly diversiﬁed, so that idiosyncratic risk is
diversiﬁed away. Outcomes are thus centered on the mean, which depends on the realization of the
common-factor and on the bank’s monitoring choice.
Let s denote the loan-solvency rate realization. For a diversiﬁed portfolio, s can be equal to 1, α
or α. The outcome s = 1 occurs with the probability p that the common factor realization is θ (up-
turn), hence all loans perform. With probability 1− p, the common factor realization is θ (downturn),
and the outcome is s = α if the bank has monitored and s = α otherwise.
Clearly, certain outcomes signal the bank’s action. For example, the outcome s = α perfectly reveals
that the bank has not monitored. Likewise, s = α reveals that the bank has monitored, in spite of α
not being the highest portfolio outcome. The highest outcome of course, is s = 1, but this is just good
luck. As we shall see later (Section 4), in this framework debt ﬁnancing becomes suboptimal.
3. Optimal contract
What is the optimal contract with outside ﬁnance providers, i.e. the one that maximizes bank’s
proﬁts? Since unmonitored projects have negative net present value and monitored projects positive,
an optimal contract necessarily implies the incentive to monitor. Moreover, ﬁnal investors make zero
proﬁts. It follows that the bank’s proﬁt per unit of lending is the surplus generated by a monitored
loan, pR + (1− p)αR − (1+ F ). Clearly this is positive, so the bank’s proﬁts are increasing in lending.
It follows that an optimal contract maximizes the amount of outside ﬁnance, and hence bank’s
lending, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (the bank must ﬁnd it proﬁtable to monitor)
and the participation constraint (investors make zero proﬁts). It is also easy to show that the optimal
contract must use all available information to reward the bank “as much as possible” for observable
outcomes that signal monitoring. To see why, consider contracts of the form (W1,Wα,Wα), where
Ws is the bank’s income. Investors’ income is sLR −Ws with s ∈ {1,α,α}. The case s = 1 results from
good luck (the common factor realization is θ = θ ); thus income W1 can be deﬁned as the bank’s
reward for good luck. If s = α, then necessarily the bank has monitored; Wα is the bank’s reward
for monitoring. If s = α, then necessarily the bank has not monitored; Wα is the bank’s reward for
not monitoring. Clearly, the optimal contract has Wα = 0; that is, the bank must be penalized as
much as possible for not monitoring. In principle, also W1 should be as small as possible. However, if
W1 < Wα the contract would be vulnerable to portfolio outcome falsiﬁcation: in the upturn the bank
would proﬁt by destroying part of the lending income (as by forgiving some of borrower debt) so
as to mimic the performance of a monitored portfolio in the downturn, thereby getting Wα instead
of W1. Thus, the bank’s income schedule needs to satisfy the monotonicity constraint W1 >Wα .
The optimal contracting problem can then be expressed as follows:
max
L,W1,Wα
{
pW1 + (1− p)Wα − F L − K
}
(1)
s.t. pW1 + (1− p)Wα − F L − K > pW1 − K , (2)
p(RL − W1) + (1− p)(αLR − Wα) = L − K , (3)
W1 >Wα. (4)
The objective function is the bank’s expected proﬁt conditional on monitoring. This equals the
expected income, pW1 + (1− p)Wα , less monitoring costs, F L, less internal ﬁnance, K . Condition (2)
is the incentive compatibility constraint: the bank’s proﬁt conditional on monitoring must be at least
as great as without monitoring. This is pW1 − K because Wα = 0. Condition (3) is the investors’ zero
proﬁt constraint, that the amount of ﬁnance investors provide, L − K , equals their expected income—
the left-hand side of (3). Condition (4) is a monotonicity constraint on the bank’s income schedule
discussed above.
Rearranging terms, the problem reduces to:
max
L,W1,Wα
L
[
pR + (1− p)αR − (1+ F )] (1’)
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s.t. L 6 (1− p)
F
Wα, (2’)
p(RL − W1) + (1− p)(αLR − Wα) = L − K , (3’)
W1 >Wα. (4’)
Since [pR + (1− p)αR − (1+ F )] > 0, maximizing proﬁts amounts to maximizing lending L. Now
suppose that
[
p + (1− p)α]R − F
1− p > 1. (5)
In this case, the bank would be effectively unconstrained and could borrow an inﬁnite amount: if (5)
holds, then for any L there exist Wα , W1, such that the incentive-compatibility and the monotonicity
constraints hold and investors make non-negative proﬁts (for example, W1 = Wα = F L(1−p) ). We rule
out this rather uninteresting case by assuming:
pR + (1− p)αR − F
1− p < 1. (A3)
Next, deﬁne c∗
c∗ ≡ {1− [p + (1− p)α]R}+ F
1− p .
By (A1)–(A2), we have (1− p)(α −α)R > F , and [p + (1− p)α]R > (α −α)R; hence c∗ < 1. We have:
Proposition 1. At the optimum, the bank’s lending capacity is
L∗ = K
c∗
,
and the bank’s income is
W ∗α = W ∗1 ≡ L∗
{[
p + (1− p)α]R − 1}+ K , W ∗α = 0.
The proof is very simple: by the incentive compatibility constraint (2’), maximization of L requires
the reward for monitoring, Wα , to be as great as possible. The investor’s participation constraint then
implies that W1 must be as small as possible. This means that the monotonicity constraint binds:
W1 = Wα . Substituting into the participation constraint gives W1 = Wα = L{[p+ (1− p)α]R −1}+ K .
The incentive constraint then reduces to c∗L 6 K . Since c∗ > 0 (by (A3)), the highest lending level that
satisﬁes the incentive constraint—the bank’s lending capacity—is L∗ ≡ Kc∗ .
Could the bank do better than L∗? Yes, if it could credibly promise to give ﬁnal investors a larger
portion of the portfolio outcome in the upturn—which is merely due to good luck. The reward for
monitoring would then increase, and so therefore would lending and proﬁts. But, this promise is not
credible, as it would violate the monotonicity constraint.
For future reference, the bank’s expected proﬁt with the optimal contract is
Π∗ = pW ∗1 + (1− p)W ∗α − F L∗ − K ≡ pW ∗1 − K
(
by L∗ ≡ K
c∗
)
. (6)
Having thus characterized the optimal contract, in the remainder of the paper we discuss the issue
of implementation. In the real world, bank ﬁrst collect deposits, then make loans, and then possibly
engage in CRT. We show that the optimal contract cannot be implemented with debt, but can be
implemented with debt ﬁnancing cum optimal CRT.
4. Debt ﬁnancing
In this section we ask what can be implemented with debt. What is the maximum amount of
lending that makes the bank still willing to monitor, when L − K is raised by debt? Suppose the bank
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issues debt D = L − K with a face value such that it pays Ds if the portfolio-solvency rate is s.8
The problem reduces to determining the maximum value of L for which the incentive compatibility
constraint still holds. With debt, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes:
p(LR − D1) + (1− p)(αLR − Dα) − F L − K > p(LR − D1) + (1− p){αLR − Dα} − K . (7)
The left-hand side of (7) is the bank’s expected proﬁt conditional on monitoring; the right-hand side,
on not monitoring.
Clearly, the bank must be solvent in state s = α; for otherwise it would not monitor. Then it
is necessarily solvent in s = 1, and therefore the face value of the debt that satisﬁes the investors’
zero-proﬁt constraint is L − K . It follows that D1 = Dα = L − K , and the incentive constraint reduces
to:
(1− p)[αLR − (L − K )]− F L > (1− p)max{αLR − (L − K ),0}.
If the bank is solvent in state s = α, i.e. if αLR > (L − K ), then the incentive constraint becomes:
R(α − α)> F
1− p
which always holds by (A1)–(A2). This merely says that if it is ﬁnancially unconstrained the bank
would always monitor. Thus, L will be raised at least up to the point where the bank is ﬁnancially
constrained, i.e. where it is insolvent in state s = α. When αLR < (L − K ), the incentive constraint is
αLR − (L − K )> F L
1− p
which holds if and only if:
L 6 K
(1− αR) + F1−p
.
Deﬁne cD ≡ (1− αR) + F1−p . Thus, we have
Proposition 2. If the bank is ﬁnanced with debt only, the optimal contract cannot be implemented. The bank’s
lending capacity is
LD = K
cD
< L∗,
and its income is
W D1 = LD(R − 1) + K ; W Dα = LD(αR − 1) + K ; W Dα = 0.
With a debt contract for ﬁnancing, the better the outcome the greater the bank’s income: W D1 >
W Dα . This means that good luck is over-rewarded and monitoring is under-rewarded, W
D
α < W
∗
α .
As a consequence, the minimum amount of capital per lending unit needed to make it incentive-
compatible to monitor increases, cD > c∗ , and the bank’s lending capacity therefore shrinks, LD < L∗ .
In our model debt ﬁnancing is distortionary because monitoring is most valuable when the
macroeconomic shock is adverse (downturn); monitoring removes the possibility of a high propor-
tion of loan defaults, but still results in some defaults. The bank’s payoff should be reallocated from
the high state (merely luck) to the monitoring–revealing state, so that the bank gets a higher reward
in this state. But debt does exactly the opposite and is therefore suboptimal.9
8 If the loan-portfolio revenue, sLR , is not lower than the face value of the debt, then Ds equals the face value—the bank is
solvent. Otherwise, Ds = sLR .
9 Formally, in our model the loan-portfolio return distribution fails to satisfy the monotone-likelihood-ratio property (MLRP)
with respect to monitoring effort. Failure of MLRP is suﬃcient but not necessary for debt to be suboptimal. In Chiesa (1992),
for instance, MLRP holds but debt is suboptimal because it offers poor incentives in bad states.
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In the previous CRT literature (Pennacchi, 1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and Zhou,
2001; Morrison, 2005; Behr and Lee, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Parlour and Winton, 2007)
the monitoring–revealing outcomes are the “high” outcomes.10 In our model this corresponds to the
special case p = 0. If p = 0, then the monitoring–revealing state is also the most favorable. In this
case, the reward for monitoring under debt ﬁnancing is the same as in an optimal contract, W Dα ≡
W ∗α . Differently put, when p = 0, cD ≡ c∗ < 0: when all idiosyncratic risk is diversiﬁed away, the ﬁrst-
best optimum is attained, and under an optimal contract the bank’s lending level is unconstrained—as
in Diamond (1984) and in Laux (2001), in an industrial organization context. Since debt maximizes
the bank’s reward for monitoring, additional arrangements, such as CRT, can only reduce monitoring
incentives. This explains the negative effect of credit risk transfer found in the literature. But when
debt ﬁnancing under-rewards monitoring, CRT is the right tool for restoring incentives, as we now
show.
5. Optimal credit risk transfer
Let us now suppose that after collecting deposits and making loans, banks engage in CRT. One
problem with this strategy is that the bank, having promised to engage in the optimal risk transfer
deal, may not honor this promise once having raised funds. To proceed, we ﬁrst assume that the bank
can commit to engage in such a deal. Later we address the issue of commitment (Section 6). Consider
the following arrangement:
1. The bank raises deposits L∗ − K and ﬁnances the optimal loan portfolio L∗ .
2. It then forms a special purpose vehicle and securitizes/sells the entire loan portfolio for a total
price P0.
3. The bank credit-enhances the deal by giving investors the option to sell their claims back to the
bank for a total price P . To back this guarantee, the bank injects P as cash collateral.
The above contract deﬁnes the CRT mechanism (P0, P ). The total price P at which investors can
sell their claims back to the bank deﬁnes the protection provided to investors (security buyers).
Clearly, it must be P 6 P0—the cash collateral injection required is feasible.
Deﬁne P ≡ [αR + F1−p ]L∗ and P ≡ αL∗R as the lower and upper bound of the protection that an
optimal CRT mechanism provides.11
Proposition 3. Any credit-risk-transfer mechanism with P ∗ ∈ [P , P ], and P∗0 ≡ pL∗R + (1− p)αL∗R, imple-
ments the optimal contract.
Proof. Let us consider the bank’s income under the CRT mechanism (P∗0, P∗) in each possible state
s ∈ {1,α,α}. If s = 1, loan-portfolio revenue L∗R realizes. Investors forgo their options, and the bank
collects the cash collateral. Thus its total cash is L∗[pR + (1 − p)αR], out of which the bank repays
L∗ − K to depositors, ending up with income [p + (1− p)α]L∗R − (L∗ − K ) ≡ W ∗1 .
If s = α (a state that occurs only if the bank has monitored), loan-portfolio revenue αL∗R realizes.
Investors again forgo their options, since max(αL∗R, P∗) = αL∗R (this follows from P∗ ∈ [P , P ]). Then
the bank collects the cash collateral and repays depositors, ending up with income [p+(1− p)α]L∗R−
(L∗ − K ) ≡ W ∗α .
Finally, if s = α, loan-portfolio revenue αL∗R realizes. Investors now exercise their options and so
the bank loses the cash collateral. Thus, the bank has total cash [p + (1− p)α]L∗R − P∗ + αL∗R , and
its income is
max
{[
p + (1− p)α]L∗R − P∗ + αL∗R − (L∗ − K ),0}.
10 This means that the loan-portfolio return distribution satisﬁes the monotone-likelihood-ratio property (MLRP) with respect
to monitoring effort; and so debt can be optimal (Innes, 1990).
11 By (A1)–(A2), we have (1− p)(α − α)R > F ; hence P > P .
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Since L∗ ≡ Kc∗ , we have [p + (1− p)α]L∗R − P +αL∗R ≡ L∗ − K , and since P∗ > P , the bank’s income
is nil. Hence, Wα ≡ W ∗α . This proves that (P∗0, P∗) implements the optimal contract. 
Proposition 3 shows that the bank’s income with the securitization scheme (P∗0, P∗) is the same
as in the optimal contract, which maximizes lending capacity. Depositors and investors break even,
and all loans are monitored. Note that the CRT mechanism is based on loan portfolios rather than
individual loans, and is backed by an extent of credit enhancement in the interval [P , P ].
Portfolio securitization, backed by the required extent of credit enhancement, resolves the short-
comings of debt ﬁnancing: it shifts income from the “lucky” high state to the monitoring–revealing
state, so giving the bank a higher reward in the latter. This would not be true for a partial loan sale (as
in Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Pennacchi, 1988); in a partial sale, or equivalently a sale with partial
recourse, the bank is exposed to common exogenous risk: its income in the monitoring–revealing state
s = α is lower than that in the high state s = 1. That is, the reward for monitoring is not maximized,
so the bank’s lending capacity falls below the maximum.
Any protection in the interval [P , P ] supports the monitoring equilibrium. Outside this interval,
however, the bank’s monitoring incentives are undermined. To be precise, it is clear from the proof of
Proposition 3 that if P < P then Wα > W ∗α , and if P > P then Wα < W ∗α ; in both cases, the bank’s
incentive-compatibility constraint for monitoring optimal loan portfolio L∗ fails to hold.
6. The bank’s incentive to engage in optimal CRT: prudential regulation
As we noted above, banks raise funds and make loans before engaging in CRT. But does the bank
still have an incentive to engage in optimal CRT once the funds have been raised? In fact it does not.
An unregulated bank would have an incentive to credit enhance the CRT deal excessively, to such an
extent that effectively amounts to retaining the entire credit risk.
Consider again the sequence of events detailed in Section 5. Once the bank has borrowed L∗ − K
and lent L∗ , does it ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage in the optimal CRT deal with P∗ ∈ [P , P ], or does it
make a higher proﬁt by setting P < P or P > P?
Clearly, if P < P , the dilution of monitoring incentives would be factored into the pricing of the
insuﬃciently-credit-enhanced securities. These would be priced at
P0 ≡ pL∗R + (1− p)max(P ,αL∗R) < P∗0,
because P < P < αL∗R , so the bank would be worse off.12,13
However, consider the deal (P0, P ), with P 6 L∗R and P > P ≡ αL∗R , and
P0 = pL∗R + (1− p)P .
This contract provides investors with excessive protection, P > P , but since this is factored into the
pricing, investors would break even as they do in the optimal CRT deal. However, the bank would
12 That is, Π < Π∗ ≡ pW ∗1 − K . To show this, note that
Π ≡ pmax[P0 − (L∗ − K ),0]+ (1− p){max[P0 − P +min(P ,αL∗R) − (L∗ − K ),0]}− K
is the bank’s proﬁt with an insuﬃciently enhanced deal, P < P . If the term inside curly brackets is positive, that is the bank
is solvent in s = α, then the inequality Π < Π∗ certainly holds, because depositors do not make losses, investors break even,
and hence the value loss resulting from not monitoring bears on the bank. If the bank is insolvent in s = α, then the inequality
reduces to:
W ∗1 >max
[
P0 − (L∗ − K ),0
]
,
which again holds because W ∗1 ≡ [p + (1 − p)α]L∗R − (L∗ − K ), and [p + (1 − p)α]L∗R > P0 ≡ pL∗R + (1 − p)max(P ,αL∗R)
(by αL∗R > P > P ).
13 A referee has pointed out that a bank could still cheat by selling loans and investing the money raised in option contracts
that pay off in state s = 1. Clearly, this is feasible only if the option contract is not subject to capital requirements, it then
suggests a further argument in favor of capital requirements on retained risks.
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make more proﬁt, while depositors would lose. To see why, consider the bank’s payoff in state s ∈
{1,α}. In s = 1, investors forgo their options and the bank’s income is
W1 = P0 − (L∗ − K ) ≡ W ∗1 + (1− p)(P − P ).
In s = α, investors now exercise their options and the bank ends up with income
Wα = max
{
(P0 − P ) + αL∗R − (L∗ − K ),0
}≡ max{W ∗α − p(P − P ),0}.
Clearly, an excessively credit-enhanced deal (P0, P ) under-rewards monitoring, Wα < W ∗α , and over-
rewards good luck, W1 > W ∗1 . As a result, the bank would not monitor, failing in the downturn. Its
proﬁt would then be
Π = pW1 − K ≡ p
[
W ∗1 + (1− p)(P − P )
]− K (8)
which is higher than the proﬁt it makes in the optimal scheme, Π∗ , whenever P > P (compare (8)
and (6)). The intuition is that lending L∗ and retaining risk in excess of the optimal amount (i.e.,
raising the protection provided to investors above P ) is tantamount to lending in excess of incentive-
based capacity and shifting losses to depositors. That is, it entails an ex-post wealth transfer from
depositors to the bank. The greater the protection, the larger this wealth transfer.
Anticipating that the bank will retain the entire credit risk, depositors will ration the bank so that
the lending it can make does not exceed LD , the maximum lending volume that will be monitored in
the absence of CRT.
This time inconsistency problem could be addressed in various ways. For example, the optimal use
of CRT might be sustained by reputational mechanisms (Boot et al., 1993), or by (the threat of) bank
runs à la Diamond and Rajan (2001), or, more generally, by demandable debt: If the bank refrained
from optimal CRT after lending L∗ , funds would be withdrawn and the bank would be unable to
reﬁnance its debt (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). Clearly, the threat of withdrawals/runs needs to be
credible; deposits ought to be uninsured. In the reminder of this section we brieﬂy discuss another
possible way to restore eﬃciency, namely, through capital requirements on loans conditioned on the
extent of retained risk.
In our setting, the capital requirement must be conditioned on the ratio P/L, i.e., the protection
provided to security buyers per unit of loans. Speciﬁcally, suppose that for any given PL > αR , the
capital requirement is
cP/L = c∗ + p
(
P
L
− αR
)
.
With such a capital requirement in place, if the bank after having made L loans engages in the CRT
deal with protection P , then regulatory capital amounts to cP/L L and the capital constraint, cP/L L 6 K ,
is met only if P 6 K−c∗Lp + αRL or:
P 6 c
∗(L∗ − L)
p
+ αRL. (9)
It can be shown that the bank would always monitor.14 As a result, its expected proﬁt is
Π = [pR + (1− p)αR − (1+ F )]L
14 The bank’s monitoring incentive-compatibility constraint is
pW1 + (1− p)Wα − F L> pW1 + (1− p)Wα,
that is,
Wα − F
1− p L>Wα.
If this constraint is satisﬁed, securities are priced at P0 ≡ pLR + (1− p)max(αLR, P ). Clearly, if Wα > 0, i.e. the bank is solvent
in s = α, then the monitoring incentive constraint certainly holds, because depositors do not make losses, investors break even,
and hence the value loss resulting from not monitoring bears on the bank. If Wα = 0 the constraint reduces to Wα > F1−p L.
Since
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which is increasing in L. Thus, the bank sets L as large as possible, i.e. L = L∗ . This however requires
P 6 αRL∗ ≡ P .
Thus we have
Proposition 4. A CRT mechanism backed by excessive credit enhancement—condition (9) is violated for a
given L—undermines the bank’s monitoring incentives and entails an ex-post wealth transfer from depositors
to the bank. A capital requirement on loans conditioned on the extent of retained risk
cP/L = c∗ + p
(
P
L
− αR
)
prevents such a wealth transfer, restoring eﬃciency.
Prudential regulation thus solves the commitment/time-inconsistency problem: Properly devised
risk-based capital requirements ensure that, for any given L, the extent of risk retained by the bank
is such that monitoring incentives are preserved. Depositors are then willing to provide the funds the
bank needs for ﬁnancing the eﬃcient portfolio L∗ , and once the funds have been raised the bank
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to engage in optimal CRT. Thus, in equilibrium, L = L∗ and P = P∗ ∈ [P , P ]. This
also means that the regulatory capital constraint is slack.
7. Related literature
This work is related to various strands of literature. In Duffee and Zhou (2001), the incentive
for risk transfer comes from deadweight costs associated with bank insolvency. The article examines
individual credit risk transfers, such as credit default swaps (CDS) and individual loan sales, and shows
that as long as the asymmetric information about loan quality varies during the life of the loan, credit
derivatives (CDS) dominate loan sales in circumventing lemon problems caused by banks’ superior
information on loan quality. However, the introduction of credit derivative markets can cause the
breakdown of the loan-sale market. This is detrimental if the asymmetric information problem is one
of adverse selection, whereas it may be beneﬁcial if the problem is moral hazard, because preventing
(individual) loan sales amounts to averting a decrease in monitoring. In contrast, we have shown that
in itself CRT enhances monitoring. Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) ﬁnd the rationale for CRT in ceilings
on banks’ portfolio risks. In Morrison (2005), credit derivatives facilitate risk sharing by a risk-averse
bank.
In Allen and Carletti (2006) risk aversion, and specialization across banking and insurance interme-
diaries, provide scope for risk-sharing between the banking and insurance sectors. The article focuses
on liquidity shocks and their interaction with CRT in creating contagion between the two sectors.
Wagner and Marsh (2004) hold that part of banks’ credit risks may be transferred to non-banks be-
cause of the difference between banks’ and non-banks’ bankruptcy costs. Nicolò and Pelizzon (2008)
show how various CRT instruments can signal the quality of bank loans under binding (exogenous)
capital requirements. DeMarzo (2005), and earlier Boot and Thakor (1993), have shown how asset
pooling and tranching may reduce informational asymmetries. Several authors have analyzed loan
sales as an alternative to traditional on-balance-sheet funding that can be cheaper either because
it signals asset quality (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987) or because of exogenous reserve and capital
requirements (Pennacchi, 1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995).
Wα = max
{
(P0 − P ) +min(αLR, P ) − (L − K ),0
}
≡ max{[p + (1− p)α]LR − pmax[P − αLR,0] − (L − K ),0},
the constraint writes as:{[
1− [p + (1− p)α]R + F
1− p
]
+ pmax
[
P
L
− αR,0
]}
L6 K ,
which reduces to KL > c∗ + pmax[ PL − αR,0], or equivalently condition (9), whenever PL > αR .
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Here we suggest a novel explanation for CRT that does not rely on bankruptcy costs, risk aversion,
or regulatory constraints. In our model, optimal CRT reduces the amount of capital that the bank
must stake in order for it to be incentive-compatible to monitor/screen its loans. Thus, the volume of
monitored ﬁnance increases, and welfare improves. This paper therefore complements Arping (2004),
who also shows that CRT can create value on incentive-based grounds, albeit for completely different
reasons. In his paper, properly devised credit derivatives allow the bank to commit credibly to ter-
minating poorly performing projects, by insulating banks from borrowers’ interim project losses. This
corrects borrowers’ distorted incentives for effort and thereby increases investment project returns.
In Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) regulation (capital and reserve require-
ments) can give banks an incentive for CRT. They study optimal individual-loan sales, i.e. the optimal
portion of individual loans to be sold. This trades the beneﬁts in terms of regulatory-cost savings,
which increase with the portion sold, off against the costs of under-monitoring, which are higher,
the larger the portion sold. In equilibrium, the bank sells part of the loan and chooses a suboptimal
level of monitoring. The same trade-off occurs in loan syndication. Supporting empirical evidence is
provided by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000). Negative repercussions of CRT on monitoring incentives
are also found by Duffee and Zhou (2001), Morrison (2005), Behr and Lee (2005), Parlour and Plantin
(2008), and Parlour and Winton (2007). In all these works debt ﬁnancing maximizes the reward for
monitoring—the monitoring–revealing outcomes are the “high” outcomes. Additional arrangements,
such as CRT, can only reduce monitoring incentives.
Froot and Stein (1993, 1998) argue that otherwise risk-neutral institutions may well be averse
to cash-ﬂow volatility and engage in risk management, the argument being that agency problems
constrain outside ﬁnance, making investment sensitive to the availability of internal funds. We have
shown that optimal risk management in itself mitigates agency problems. The availability of outside
ﬁnance expands. Finally, it is well known that collateral attenuates moral hazard and boosts the ability
to raise outside ﬁnance (Tirole, 2006). We show that optimal risk management maximizes the volume
of outside ﬁnance that can be raised for any given amount of collateral—in our framework, bank
capital.
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that a value-maximizing ﬁrm that raises debt will hold a hedge port-
folio that shifts resources from the non-default states to the default states so as to minimize expected
bankruptcy costs. However, they point out that a ﬁrm that acts on behalf of its shareholders has an
ex-post incentive not to hedge, transferring wealth from debt holders to shareholders. It will then be
diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to credibly precommit to hedge, making this strategy time inconsistent.15 Both
in Smith and Stulz and in our model, albeit for completely different reasons, risk transfer addresses
the shortcomings of debt ﬁnancing, and this makes it time inconsistent. We have shown that bank
prudential regulation solves the time-inconsistency/commitment problem of banks’ hedging (optimal
CRT).
8. Concluding remarks
Dynamite is a very useful tool, if used properly. The same can be said of credit risk transfer. We
have shown that optimal CRT creates value on incentive-based grounds: it enhances loan monitoring
and expands lending. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual
loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be
precisely delimited; it must be within a deﬁned interval. Outside that interval, monitoring incentives
are undermined.
Thus, our analysis suggests that the common wisdom, supported by the previous literature, that
CRT harms monitoring incentives is misleading. The problem is the bank’s incentive to credit enhance
its CRT instruments to the extent required to implement the optimal contract. While insuﬃcient credit
enhancement is never proﬁtable, we have shown that excessive credit enhancement is proﬁtable:
15 Also in the banking model of Duffee and Zhou (2001), the rationale for risk transfer is costly bankruptcy. Time-inconsistency
problems should then arise. However, Duffee and Zhou do not model the bank’s capital structure and assume that the dead-
weight costs associated with bank insolvency fall on the bank.
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the bank, after collecting deposits and originating loans, has an incentive to retain too much risk,
undermining its monitoring incentives. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements can restore
eﬃciency, making it proﬁtable for the bank to engage in optimal CRT. But with deposit insurance and
in the absence of proper regulation or other disciplining mechanisms, there is a threshold level of
credit enhancement above which the quality of the assets that back CRT products deteriorates.16
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